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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK RIGGLE and
H. RIGGLE, his wife,
Plai1diffs and Respondents,
vs.
DAINES
COMPANY, a partnership, D.R. DAINES,
R. :\I.
aucl .J. NORMAN
DAINES,
Defeudants and Appellants.

Case No.
11629

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Snit for collection of the amount due on a promissory
11ote.
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
Tlw cansP was tried to the Court, the Honorable
Hanson, J uclge. The Court entered judgment
for the balance due on the promissory note in favor of
tlw Plaintiffs and against the Defendants, Daines Manufacturing Company, a partnership, D. R. Daines and J.
Xonnan Daines.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants - Appellants, :::wek to reverse the judgment of the District Court.
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs - Re:::;pondents, Frank Riggle and
Geneva H. Riggle, are hereinafter ref en Pd to
"Riggle", the DPfendants - Ap1wllants, Daines ?\IannfaC'tnring Company, a partnership, D. IL Daine:-; and .J.
Norman Daines, are lwreinafter refrrred to as "Daines."
This is an appeal from a jndguwnt grant<>d in th!'
favor of Rigglt> by the Salt Lake County Di:::;trict Court
after trial and npon entry of Finding:-; of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The statements of fact offered by Daine::; an' not
entirely supported by the record and \\'P should lib, to
note the following matters which are inconsistent \ritl1
the facts or not supported by the record:
A. On page two of Daines' Brief, refrrPnce i;-;
made to a lost or destroyed written agrePment. No
written memoranda or other acceptable evidrm•p
of the employment contract with the partnership
has been offered or proposed in evidence and no
lost or destroyed contract has been e::;tablishP<l.
B. At page two of their brief, Daines claims a
corporation assumed partnership obligation;-;.
The maker was never released or substituted.
Riggle's only remedy is against the Daines for
payment of the note they executed.
C. At page three of Daines' Brief, it is claimed
that Riggle demanded a bonus for making tlw
2

loan. No bonus or inducement has been proved.
proposed that 3% of gross profits of
Dain<'s hP applied to pay
obligation. Payment
arrang<'nwnts are only good business.
D. At page fonr, the Daines' Brief states, "The
gronn<l was f
for a usurious contract." Such
a statPment is not a fact, not supported by evic1<>nce an<l ('ontrary to the findings of the Judge
of thP District Court. (R-47,48)
Tlit· n·stat<·<l faets snpported hy the record are as
follO\rs:
On .Jul.': S, 19:J4, Higgl<' loan<'d Daim·s $10,000.00 by
d(•Jiy,·r:· of his elH·ek ( P-1) and in exchange receivPd a
prnrnissor>· not<' in tlw arnount of $10,000.00 carrying inkn·st payah!P at v; pt>r annum. The }H'Omissory note
\\a:-: ('Xt·(·ukd h>- (•aeh partiwr - D. R. Daines, R. M.
Dairn·s and .J. Korman Dain<'s. (P-3)
Higgl1· was told h:- tlw Daines that they needed
11101w>- and at thPir n·qtwst made the loan. Riggle innstigat(•<l thP eornpany and lwlieved it had an excellent
('liane\• for sttf'C'Pss if propPrly managt>d.
ThPn' wt>re S\'\·Pral cliscussions with the partners on
tlH· mdhocl for payrnPnt of the loan. All discussions were
('.On<·(•nwd with payment of the principal of the note on
a n•gular basis as no installment paynwnt terms were
('ontairn·<l in tlw note.
Daim·s and each of them admit the execution of the
noh·, that tht>ir signatures are genuine, that the promissor:· not<' was not paid, and that the account as itemized
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by Riggle and stated in the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law was correct. (R-122) Daines ah;o agreed
that there is a balance on the note for principal and interest in the amount of $18,963.92 as of Febrnary 11,
1969. (P-2, P-5, P-6, and D-4)

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

NO SUPPLEMENT AL AGREEMENT RELATED TO THE
EXECUTION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE.

Daines claim usury from an oral or lost written Pmployment agreement that was created as an induce11H·nt
to the loan.
An examination of the evidence and record will not
support Daines' contention and upholds the trial court's
Finding of Fact that there was no usurious transaction.
Daines admit executing the promissory note. DainPs
did not offer any document or other written proof of any
written agreement or obligation with Riggle other than
the promissory note.
Only one partner testified that there was a writt1·n
employment agreement entered into at the time of tlw
making of the note.
This alleged agreement is Daines basis for the claim
of usury. D. R. Daines, a partner, testified that he prepared the alleged written agreement on his stated tenm;,
that he had it in his control, but that it is lost, although
all other company records are available.

4

Daiiws tlwn tri<·<l to <·stablish the alleged written
l'Ontraet hy oral <·vi<l<·nc<·. Thc·re are specific, accepted
pro<·<'dnn•s for introduction of secondary evidence to
pro\·<' a writing. Daim•s have not even offered to prove
s<'<·ornlar:·: <·vid<·nc<,, sneh as eopiPs, memorandums, etc.
of tl1P pnrporkd agn·<·ment.
of tlu· Pxistem·p of a written agreement
d<H's not <'stablish an agT<·<'ment.
Biggl<· has d<'ni<'<l making any othC'r agrPement with
l>aiiws at the time of tlw loan. (R-1:3, 36) Riggle ent<·r<'d into an oraT, month to month employment agree111<'nt somP two months after tlw note was executed and
Ii<' had paid tlw $10,000.00 to Daines.
Tht>n• ts llO real "'·idt•11c0 of a written employment
agret'm<'11t hrtwP<'n Dai1ws and Riggle. Daines, as the
partv <'laiming that a written agreement existed, has the
ln1nl<·H of pro,·illg- the agn•ement in the absence of prod1wing the original writing.
Dain<'s must <'Stablish a lost or destroyed document
Ji.,. d<·ar eom·incing t•videnet>.
DainPs has not carried the burden required to esa lost or dPstroye<l document. A comparison of the
<·\·idenee adducPd as against tlw required burden of proof
indicatPs that DainPs has not Pstablished the existence of
a 11suriom; contract or any other contract.
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In order to Pstablish the terms of a lost contract, tlw
following matters must be Pstahlished hy a prepond('l'ence of the evidt-nce. (29 Am. Jur.2d E,-idencP, See. 4(i0;
23A CJS Evidence, Sec. 83G A. Original existence of the document. Daines daimed that an employment agreement was lH'PparPd by himself on his own terms, but that such an agrePment L'annot be found. Daines prepared the alh•ged agreement,
had control over it and control of the partiwrship rPL'ords
and cannot locate the agreement, though all otl1l·r n·conb
are available. Daines does not state whether or not copiPs
were prepared, a memorandmn made or any other
ondary evidence available to lH'OVl' the l'xistenee of t11P
agreement. No other partner substantiated t]w elairnl·d
agreement. Nothing has been produced to suh:-;tantiattthe claim of the existence of the docunwnt and Rigg-IP
denies existence of any written agreement.
B. Execution of the original document. Thel'l' is no
testimony of the matuality of the elainwd writtPn agn•(·ment or that Riggle executed any agreement. Dairn·s
claimed that each of the partners executed the agTeeml•111,
yet no supporting evidence was adducPd from tht• otlwr
partners. Riggle denies that lw exeeuted any agTl'l'Itwnt
with the Daines partnership.
C. Delivery and acceptance of the document. Dairn·:-:
testified that he typed the agreement at the officl' of
Riggle, apparently thereby claiming that there was a
delivery of the document. Daines said he prepared tlw
alleged agreement on his own terms, that he had pos6

sl·ssion of the agn·(•111<·nt and the company's records and
d tl1is is t1H· only cornpany record that he cannot find.
'l'IH·n· is no supporting <·vid<·nec· of the delivery of any
original <·ontraet or of l{iggle's acct>ptance of any written
En·n assuming that .i\lr. D. R. Daines is truthJ'ti I \\·]11·n Ii!' says hP prt>pan·d thP docwnent there is no
1·\·id1·nc·1·of its d<·li\<TY to Riggle or his acceptance thereof. 111 fad, all th<• ind1·1wndent evidence indicates that
Higgl<· \\·as <·rnploy(•d substantially aftl>r the date of thP
note>. (1 1 -:'i) (H-±1, 81)
D. T1·rn1s or eont<'nts of thP agret>rnent. Riggle
dt>ni1·s tlw eoin('idental \nittt>n agn·ement. There is no
otl11·r 1Tid<·m·p supporting a written agreemt>nt. No writti·n eontraet has lw<·n PstahlishPd hy agrt>t>ment among the
parti1•s. J)ai1ws t<·stifo·d as to certain terms of the alleged
<·ontrnet, all of ,,·hi<'h WPl'l' d<'nit>d by Riggle. No contract
\ms pron•d or proffered which was enforceable, by either
Dai1ws or Riggi<'. 1f thP eon tract is not sufficiently well
1·stahlish<'<l to afford Riggi<' a cause of action thereunder,
th1·n it
is not snffieiently well established to
<'ii use him to forfeit his ten thousand dollars.
Dain1•s
ahont tlw tPrms of the alleged
agT<·<·nwnt \\·as l'<'eitation ot' a eontract executed over a
y1·ar at'tPr thP making of the loan (R-113, 114). The cont nwt n·frJTPd to was a eon tract hPhn-•t>n Mr. Riggle and
a <·orporation (DainPs l\Ianufactnring Company, Inc.) a
from the partnership
<·0111pletel:' difforPnt legal
and not a
to
action. (D-7)
HigglPs admits tlw Pxecntion of an employment cont rad \\·ith a eorporation a
after he had paid the
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partnership $10,000 and dPnies any other written agrPPment.
Daines did not relate the two employnu--nt contracts.
The corporation willingly entered into the employment agreement a year after the loan to the partnerioihi1J.
The trial judge heard the evidence from all witnesses and made a finding of fact that the loan was thP
only agreement between the parties at the time Riggl<•;;
paid $10,000 to the partnership. (R-47) The finding of
fact is supported by clear and convincing evidence. ( P-:),
P-1, P-5) (R-74, 97, 100)
E. The loss, disappearance or destruction of tlu·
document. Daines testified simply that he was unable to
find the agreement or any secondary t>Yiden('e of thf·
claimed agreement although the conipany boob and
records were available. He did not state the proc<·<lun·:-:
or methods, if any, he used to attempt to find any document. He gave no explanation of its possible disappearance other than it could not be found. There was no supporting eYidence of any loss or destruction. Daines had
control of and was able to provide all other ('Ompan:-·
records (R-112, 113) The testimony of record is not substantial nor clear and convincing that a search was made
for any lost document or that the purported docuuwnt
ever, in fact, existed.
Proof of the alleged lost document is not l'stablislwd
by testimony of the parties. Mr. Riggle emphatieally
denied several times in his testimony that there was an
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aµ;i·(·(•nwnt wit11 the Ddt·ndants at the time of the loan

:w)

Higgl1· stakd that there were discussion with
('<t<'li J)!'frndant partrn·r regarding ways of paying the
not1·s, both 11is proposals and proposals of
t!H' partrn·rs. ln addition, there was a discussion of
\1·lwtlll'r or not
Higgle would be employed as a confor th1• partnership. These discussions were not
aµ;n•(•J11(•nts at tlw time of the execution of the promissory
not(•. (H- 7±, 79, SO, Sl, 9±, 99, 98)

Ill Harcroft u;. Li cacich, 3;) C.A.2d 710, 96 P.2d 951,
(19:m), the Court stated that" . . . the burden of
provi11g tlw fact m·e1•ssarily earries with it more than
tl1P usual 1111•as1irP of responsibility ... "to establish the
('(J!lt1·nts of a lost instrm1wnt. The Court stated further
that thP evidt>net· must show, without reasonable doubt,
tlH· substantial parts uf the claimed lost instrument,
..... the t1•stirnony of the witm·ss ne-ed not be accepted
as tn1P, rn<'rc·ly twaust• thPI·e is no direct evidence to contnHliet it, as e\·idPnce may, within itself bear the earrnarks of falsity."
\Yht>ther or not evidenct> in any particular case establishes the instnunPnt by clear, satisfactory and convin<'ing evidence should be left to the trial court based
llpon tlu• faets presented to him by the various witnesses
,,·JwsP ('l't>dihility and clrnwanor it had an opportunity
to ohsPITP. The Court may bl'lieve one, many or all of the
witnessps or nonl-' of the witne8ses, but it makes the det(•nnination. \Yhen thNt> is substantial evidence in the
9

record to support the Judge's findings on whether or
not there is such an agreement, the Court's finding 0 11
the question of the agreenwnt should
sustained. Vo11
Hasseln vs. Von Hasseln, 122 C.A. 2d 7, 264 P.2d 20!1
(1953); Chichester vs. Seymour, 28 C.A. 2d G9G, 83 P.2d
301 (1938); Gooch i:s. Rodeu:ald, 432 P.2d 755, Colorado, ( 1967).
The Trial Court considered the testimony of t!iP
discussions and made the findings that they were discussions only. (R-47, Findings 7 & 8). The Court found
that there was no other agreement or usury betwt>en thP
parties at the time of making the loan. (R-47, Finding S).
The Trial Court did conclude that Riggle was employt>d
by Daines two months after the loan and the month to
month unilateral employment agreement had no relationship to an inducement for the loan (R-13, JS, 19, 33, 3G)
The Trial Court heard all evidPnce of the existPncP
of the purported agreement and found that no agTP('rnent existed at the making of the loan. The Finding is
supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record
and the Trial Court should be upheld. (P-1, P-3, P-5)
(R-47,48, 74, 79,80,81,94,98, 100, 112, 113)
1

POINT II
EVIDENCE DOES
TRANSACTION.

NOT

ESTABLISH

A USURIOUS

The only proven and admitted written agreenwnt
between the parties to this action is the Promissory N ok
dated July 8, 1954, for $10,000. ( P-3)
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Daines <·rnploy<·d HigglP on
] , 1954, on
a month to month oral agn·euwnt. The first payment of
salar!· was S<·pkrnher 1G, 1954. Social Security tax and
\ritld1olding tax W<'re d<'ducfrd from the gross amount of
t)H• ('h1·ek. (P-5)
Tlw on!!· <·rnploy11wnt agreement was a month to
month arrang<·uwnt lwtm•<•n Riggle and Daines (R-74,
Daines ,-oluntarily hired Riggle. The loan had been
rnack and DainPs usPd tlw funds (R-16). Riggle could
not c·0111pel Dain<·s to hir1_• him. Tlw employment had no
relationship to the loan. (R-47, 74, 97, 79, 80, 81)
,\s th<' trial judge found there was discussion of an
1·111plo!·rn<>nt arrangPlllPnt between the parties, both prior
to and snhsequPnt to the Joan, but the employment was
a sqiarat<' agreement eonsurnmated after the loan, and
ltad no n•lationship to tlw loan. (R-49)
A bonus or commission agreement for a loan must
lw a part of the loan arrangement at the inception of
the loan and be compensation for use of the borrowed

funds to he incorporatPd into the loan transaction and
to he usurious. The men· identity of parties to alleged
and irnpron'd agn•prnents an· insufficient to taint a prior
tram-action with usury. (91 CJS l'sury, See. 61)

In a l'PCPnt rtah case, United-American Life Insur111/('(' Company cs. Wif.lcy, 21 Ftah 2d 279, 444 P.2d 755,
(19GS) tlw Court determined that no usury was involve,<l
\\-hl're tlw Dt>f Pndant deposited certain amounts with the
Plaintiff from loan procPPds. Some of the deposits were
a ho nus or finders fee for the loan and some of the de-
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posit ,,-as for excess payment in c:uw of dl'f'anlt. Th(·
Court stated that in deh rmining thP qm :stion of nsmy,
the entire agreement must he C'Onsidt'red as it exiskd in
the inception of the loan agrePmPnt.
1

1

A k:st was put forth in th<' U11itcd-A/ll('ricun ca:se to
determine whether or not the surrounding
make the agreement usurious. ''If tlwre is a promisP to
pay a contingent sum which should makP tlw agreenwnt
usurious, it still would not be mrnrious if the contingeney
is one which is under the control of the borrower. On th<·
other hand, if the borrower cannot control a contingenc:-·,
then the contract would be usurious if th<c> amount promised to be paid as interest is great<c>r than that allowed by
law. The contingency must be a part of the agrt'enwnt
with the lender in order to taint the transaction witl1
usury."
In the case in hand, Daines claim usury hecausP of
the loan and a subsequent agreement by th<> partnershi l'
employing Riggle. The contingency of employing Rigglt>
was entirely under the control of the Daines. Riggle had
no control over the contingency and no writkn agre<'ment, no right to demand employment, no right to df'mand any other payments, no right of recourse on tlw
failure of the Daines to employ him and no right to dP-

ci<u·p dd'ault in tlw loan upon failure to pay salary or to
"mploy l1im.

Higglt> liad no right to maintain his employment once
(·111 ploy<'<l.
Higgl1· had an agn'1·ment to lw paid $10,000.00 on the
maturity datP of the promissory note. A later consurnated
Plllployment agreement was not part. of the loan agree11wnt at thP inct>ption of tlw loan.
Higglt> did not commence employment for Daines
1mtil SPptPillb(,r 1, 1954, two months after the promissory
PXPcution. Daines now trit>s to relate their voluntary
agT1'1·1rn·nt baf'k to tlw time of making the promissory
notP and clainu; that the Daines were compelled to pay
for two obligations.
Dairn·s and Riggle could contract for as many separate obligations as they desired and as long as the
obligations are not compensation one for the other, usury
<'annot he elaiml:'d by Daines.
Tht> ruh· that
must exist at the inception of
tliP loan has bt,en upheld by numerous cases. Two notable
<·ases \\·ith similar factual situations where the Supreme
( 'onrt uplwld the Trial Courts detennined that there was
11ot usurious trm1saction are the Goldenzwig and Knoll
<·asPs herPaftt>r citt'd.
Both cases invoh·l:'d payments to the lender by the
borrower
the payments required on the face of

13

the instrmm'nt. In both cases, the pay11wnts WP]'(• additional com1wnsation for the lender. ThP Court found th(·
payments not n·lated to the loan. The Court also fournl
the payments by tlw bolTO\\"l•rs \\'Pl'<' Yoluntary and W(·n·
not nsnriou::; intPrest extratkd or recein·d lwcaus(• thP
additional pay1m•nts \\'Pl'l' not agn·Pd to at the ineqltion
of the loan.
The Court held that " ... a contract i::s not usurious
where it doe::s not in its inception rP<1uire pa_\1ll<'nb whi('l1
are usuriOlrn, en'n though s1m1s an• snhsf'qrn·ntly paid
hy the obligor to the ohligee as bonuses, \\·hich coupk·<l
with the interest paid amount to a smn in excr>ss of tlH·
legal rate of interest." Goldn1::1cig i·s. Sh(/ddock, 31 C.A.
2d 719, 722, SS P.2d 93:1, 934, (193-1). SP<> also K11oll cs.
Schle11ss11cr, 112 C.A. 2d S7G, 2-17 P.:2d ::no, (19;)'.Z).
The Court in the Golde11z1rig ca::sl' statl·cl that eontract which in its inception i::s unaffrcte>d by mrnry ('HJl
never be invalidated b.'· an.'- suhse<itwnt usuriou:-; transaction.
The Goldeizzwig facts are similar to thi::s
'1]11·
borrower made substantial bonus pa_\11wnts in eonjnnction with the quarterly interest pay11wnts while paying
very small principal payments. Tlw L;ourt deh•nnirn·d
that the bonus payments wen• entirt>ly Yoluntary by tlw
borrower.
In the case at hand, there was no usury m tlt(' inception of the loan. The salary pa,nm•nts made lat(•r to
Riggle resulted from a later ind(•ppnclent negotiation.

14

Tlw agn•(•111<·11t to hin· Higgl<· <lo<·s not n·late back to the
i1w(·ption of tlH· loan.
"\11otl1('J' fad elairn('d hy Daines as ::;upporting usury
1s tliat Higgl(' was irn·x1H·ril'nced in their business and
tlwrdon· <·oitld not n·nder effrctin• service to Daines.
It Iliad<· 110 diffrn·neP to
partnership \\'hether or not
l{iggl<' had (•x1wri<'llC'<' in tlH·ir particular line of work
fw('aUs<' their eornpany\ Jll'oduet was unique (R-78, 105,
117. 118). Higgk· \Yas <>xrwriPnc<>d in business and was
alil(' to i111part th<' lwndit of his l'XJwril·nce accumulated
()\'('J'

.")O

Y('(ll'S.

Dairn·s ('lai1rn·d as another basis for usury that the
1·1nploy1rn•nt eontraet (D-7) lwtw<>Pn Higgle and Daines
:\[anufaeturing Corn pan:·, l nc. is also connected with
part1wrship loan, although <'X('cukd more than one year
aft(·r thP loan and lwt\n•Pn diffrrent parties.
Dairn·s partnPrs disaffirm a::;smnption of corporate
obligations, (D-7, P-:3) and yet claim the contract relates
to th<· timP of thP loan tran::;action and claims involvelll('nt of all parties at the incPption of the loan.
Such a conclusion eannot be drawn logically or
!(·gaily from tlw fad;;.
Tlw corporation was organized six and one-half
nwnths aftl'r tlw partnPrnhip loan. (R-105). The corporation Pmploym<"nt agrel'ment was l'xecuted over one year
aftl'r thl' loan and six months aftpr the birth of the corporation. ( D-7) PartiPs not in Pxistence at the inception
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of thl• loan could not havP agn'l'lllPnts prior to its ('Xit-ltence. The latkr born party cannot havP its
and agrPemenb relate to third iiart:· agn•(•11wnts eonsummated prior to existence.
In Gre<'n!Jcr!J cs. Jlaugwu'sl', 3!J
2d
P.2d lEl±, ( 1951), the Court stakd ..... the rnl!' is that
a bonus giv1c•n or paid h:· a stranger to a contract of loan
for his own puq>osps or reasons to induc!' thP making of
;-;uch contract b:· the lender dot's not rnak<._. tlw contrad
usurious."
In the Greenberg case, a p(-'rson owned stoek and
it to a lendl•r if the lender would loan tlw morn•y to
a borrower, a different Pntit:--· from tlw owner of th(·
stock. The Court reasoned that the subject transaction
could not be usurious because the person owning th1·
stock had the entire control and ownership and right to
d<'tl'I"rninP the disposition of that stock without thP control of the borrower, and he was not cmnp<·llPd to plPdg"('
the stock. The Court concluded tl1at the agree11wnt is not
usurious as it does not relate to the inception of tlw loan.
Here Riggle was voluntaril:--· paid by DainPs and
neither entity was compelled to hin· Riggi<'. Dainr·:'
could have terminatPd em1Jloyment at any timP.
Any agrP€ments occurring aftt>r th<· datP of the
promissory note could not lw related to the time of tlw
loan transaction so as to tai11t the loan as a usurious
transaction. The loan was a single trawmction arnl eomplete by itself at the time made.
16

POINT III
EVEN ASSUMING AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WAS
EXECUTED, THIS DOES NOT CREATE USURY.

Tl11· Trial ( 'ourt round that no (-"lllploymPnt contract
\\·a:-: in <·xi:-:t\•ne\' at th<' tim<· tlw promissory note was ex1·1·11k<l. (H--1-7, Finding-:-: 7 &. S) Assmning that such a
1·ontract ha<l h<·<·n l'Stahlislwd, this in ih;pJf would not be
The fact is that Daines did Pmploy Riggle at a
lat1·r tirn" and failf'd to follow his managl'ment suggestions and fail<'d in their hnsinPss. (P-5, R-98, llG, 124)
l t is furtlH·r obvious that if Riggle did not or could
not lH'rfonn his part of the employment contract, the
1111plo:•<·r could tPnninat<· th<· sanw for cause and avoid
a<ldi tional
tlH·re1rnd<>r and, therefore, the wage
m·n· not uneonditionally required. Services
1nust lw pNfonned in ord<·r to Parn payment. Three-days
<·onsnltation "·pn• n·qnirPd iwr month for a retainer of
or $.);).00 pcr day to aLh·ise at a business located
in a distant city. This is hardly an l'xorbitant rate.
POINT IV
THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT THE DEFENDANT'S
CONTENTIONS.

Sen•ral cases arl' cited by Daines to support their
position \mt Pxamina ti on of tlwsP casl'S in di ca te that th<::>y
do not apply to tlw cas<::> at bar.
Ln tlw Aspcitia rs. California Tru.st case 158 C.A.
:2<1 150, 322
( 1953) tht> promissory notes were
issrn>d for an amount in PXCt>Ss of the amount
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advaneP<l. Thc•n•ai'tc·r in ordPr to pa:· t11P usurious loan
the dPhtor bono\n•d tlw full amount from a third part.\·
to pay tlw original lPndl'l". rl'his ease· is elc•arly a <'as<' of
usm·:· and is elearl:· not applicabl<' to th<' instant ea:-:<'s.
In tlw casPs of Riclwnlso11 rs. Fosfrr, d 11!, 100
·wash. 57, 170 Pac. 3:21 and TVcsf1111111 1·s. Dy<·, 21-! ('al.
28, 4P.2d 1:34: ( U>:31) \n•n_• actions on r<'ll<'\\·:.tl tra11:-:ac·tions lwtwePn idPntical partic·s. 11 lw eontinuit:· of transaction was apparent and all docunwnts \H•re hefon· tlH·
Court.
In Gra1111is l'.'i. Stnens 111 N.E. :!(i:)
York) and
Cmrner Airlines, !11c. rs. Ariation Credit Corporntin11.
:280 F.:2d 895, (5th Circuit), \\Tittrn ag-r<'<'lll<'nb \\'c•n· lH·for<:> the Court and tlw Courts lll('l'<'ly intnpr<'t<·d tl1t·
written agn'<'llHc'nb. ThPn' \\·as no quPstion as to t1H· 1·<111tinuity of tlw parties. In tlH.' Co1111cr <·asp tlw transadion
became usurious \dwn an nrn·ons<·ionahlt· amount \Ya:-:
charg<'d to PXtPnd thP dm· dak. No sneh ;.;itnation 1·xi:-:tc:
in tlw instant c<isP.
The case ofRiq[Jle rs. 1Jai11es Jla1111f11ct11ri11q Colilpany, Inc., 20 Utah 2d 391, 4:)8 J>.:2d SOS ( 19(i8) is a eac:1·
bt>twePn the Plaintiff and the• eorporation, that sn<'<'<'<'<frd
to the Daines operatiom;, 1-1 hP Distriet Court grant(•d
Riggle a summary judgnH·nt whirh was app<'al<'d and
this Court rP\'Nsed on tlw hasis that furth<T ('Vid(·n1·1•
should
taken. Tlwr<> was no ruling r<>lating to tlw
issues of this case.
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C'()XCl,USlON
Hiµ;µ;I<· ha:-: olitainPd a judh1111<•nt against a partrn'r:-:hip and hrn or th<· indi\·id11al parhwrn for tlw balance
d1w on a prn111i:-::-:ory not<·. Dairn·:-: attl'mpt<·d to t'Stahlish
a <·oineid<·ntal agT<'<'lll<'nt with the promissory note and
tliat u:-:11ry n·:-:ttlt<·d from the additional agr<:>emt·nt. No
()ri.i2:i11al agT<'<'lll<·nt \nu-; introdu(·<·d or proffrrt>d, Daines
in:-:t<'ad n·I.' inµ; 011 oral t<':-:tilllony.
11 avinµ; fail<·d to <·stahli:-:h a ('Oineidental agreement,
Dai1w:-: Jl<•xt att<'lll)Jt to eharactt•riz<' an agreem1c•nt with a
<·orporation whi('h was forn1<'d aft<•r tlw promissory note
and th<· aµ;n·Plll<'nt 1·x<·c11kd om· y<'ar afkr tl11c• note to
:-:0111d1ow lw<·om<' a part of th<' original promissor.'· note.
Tiu· parti<·:-: in th<· ('orporation \nTe different from
tlH· parti<·:-: in tlw partiwr:-:hip and th<'r<:> was no continuity
()r parti<·:-: m11onµ; all th<· daim<'d agn'<'lll<'nt:::; and nott>s.
Tlwn· \Ya:-: no ohliµ;ation lwt\\"<•1•11 Riggle and DainPs for
tl11· 1·xPcution of an.'· oth<>r agI"<'<'llll'nt nor opportunity for
Hig-i.d<· to <'nfon·1• any aµ;n·<'lll<'nts against Daines other
tlian thl' not1·.

Th<·n· i:-: m·<·rwhPlming- evidl'nCP in t}H• record to
:-:llpport thP Firnlinµ;s of Faet and Conclusions of Law
dd<·n11i1wd h.'· tlw Trial Court, and the ,Judgment of that
( 'ourt in favor of Riggle against Daines should be aft'i l'Jll<•d.
Res1wctfull.'· :-:uhmittt•d,
Bielt•, JonPs & Murphy, and
\Y .•J pffrry Fillmore
AttornPys for Plaintiffs and
Respond<'n ts
19

